CFATS currently covers more than 3,200 chemical facilities, which have been assessed to present a risk of terrorist attack or exploitation.

DHS implements the CFATS program under a variety of short-term authorizations by Congress. Authorization for the current CFATS standards will sunset after July 27, 2023, if Congress does not reauthorize the program. Congress has historically considered a multi-year reauthorization for the CFATS program, but at this writing, reauthorization legislation has yet to be introduced.

The American Coatings Association (ACA), which represents the more than $26 billion paint and coatings manufacturing industry in the United States, operating in all 50 states, and employing over 50,000 people engaged in the manufacture and distribution of its products, strongly encourages multi-year reauthorization of the CFATS program. Many paint and coating facilities have previously submitted top-screens to DHS identifying chemicals of interest and have been assigned preliminary or final tiers by the department. As a result, many ACA member companies have been subject to the CFATS Risk-Based Performance Standards for some time.

ACA supports the safe handling and use of chemicals, and the structure which CFATS provides to enable that in practice. ACA is also a longstanding member of the Chemical Sector Coordinating Council (CSCC). Organized by DHS, the CSCC expands communication between industry and DHS. Through the CSCC, ACA has advised DHS on how it might develop more effective solutions to implement and improve chemical security. These recommendations are compiled from ACA’s member companies, who own and operate paint, coatings, resin, or chemical manufacturing facilities and are subject to CFATS, with a clear majority being classified as Tier 4 facilities, while just a few are Tier 3.

This Issue Backgrounder articulates ACA’s support for long-term reauthorization of CFATS as well as recommendations to enable the CFATS program to provide enhanced chemical security for stakeholders, in accordance with the statute’s Congressional intent. These enhancements include regular review of the “chemicals of interest” list and improved coordination for CFATS with other federal chemical security and safety regulatory programs.

But there are some duplicative requirements. For example, like CFATS, DOT’s Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration regulation, HM-232F, requires certain facilities have a security plan; 49 CFR 172 Subpart I requires shippers and carriers of certain hazardous materials to implement security plans; and 49 CFR §172.704(a)(5) requires in-depth security training for each employee of applicable facilities. While there is some obvious overlap on personnel training and security, there is further redundancy with requirements such as OSHA 29 CFR 1910.38, for Emergency Action Plans.

ACA has long supported federal efforts to bolster chemical security; however, CFATS and the associated imposition of overlapping — but differently applied — regulatory requirements does not further the jointly held goal of chemical security. Instead, it imposes additional and unnecessary regulatory requirements and compliance burdens on industry. ACA believes there is a real opportunity for federal agencies to work together to streamline these requirements and provide industry some relief from duplicative, onerous regulatory burdens.